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Abstract: Tri-level decision-making arises to address compromises among interacting decision entities 
distributed throughout a three-level hierarchy; these entities are respectively termed the top-level leader, the 
middle-level follower and the bottom-level follower. This study considers an uncooperative situation where 
multiple followers at the same (middle or bottom) level make their individual decisions independently but 
consider the decision results of their counterparts as references through information exchanged among 
themselves. This situation is called a reference-based uncooperative multi-follower tri-level (MFTL) 
decision problem which appears in many real-world applications. To solve this problem, we need to find an 
optimal solution achieving both the Stackelberg equilibrium in the three-level vertical structure and the Nash 
equilibrium among multiple followers at the same horizontal level. In this paper, we first propose a general 
linear MFTL decision model for this situation. We then develop a MFTL Kth-Best algorithm to find an 
optimal solution to the model. Since the optimal solution means a compromised result in the uncooperative 
situation and it is often imprecise or ambiguous for decision entities to identify their related satisfaction, we 
use a fuzzy programming approach to characterize and evaluate the solution obtained. Lastly, a real-world 
case study on production-inventory planning illustrates the effectiveness of the proposed MFTL decision 
techniques. 
Keywords: Tri-level decision-making; multilevel programming; Kth-Best algorithm; fuzzy programming; 
production-inventory planning. 
1. Introduction 
Tri-level decision-making (also known as tri-level programming) technique has been developed to deal 
with decentralized decision problems involving interacting decision entities that are distributed throughout a 
three-level hierarchy, which is a subfamily of multilevel programming [30] motivated by Stackelberg game 
theory [26]. Decision entities at the three hierarchical levels are respectively termed the top-level leader, the 
middle-level follower and the bottom-level follower. The decision entities make their individual decisions in 
sequence, from the top level to the middle level and then to the bottom level with the aim of optimizing their 
respective objectives [36]. Specifically, the leader gives priority to making a decision; however, this decision 
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is implicitly determined by the actions of the followers. The middle-level follower then reacts to the decision 
made by the leader and optimizes its own objective function while taking into account the implicit reactions 
of the bottom-level follower. Lastly, in view of the given decisions from the top and middle levels, the 
bottom-level follower makes decision to optimize its own objective function. The decision process is 
repeatedly executed until the Stackelberg equilibrium is achieved in the three-level vertical structure, which 
differs from the traditional Stackelberg game where the decisions made by the followers do not affect the 
decision, which has been already taken by the leader [11]. This category of the hierarchical decision-making 
process often appears in many decentralized management problems in applications, such as supply chain 
management [33], resource allocation optimization [20, 34] and hierarchical production operations [29]. 
The hierarchical production-inventory planning in a conglomerate enterprise can be taken as an example. 
The conglomerate is composed of a sales company, a logistics center and a manufacturing factory, which are 
distributed throughout a three-stage supply chain. To fully satisfy market demand and shorten time-to-market, 
the sales company and the logistics center have to hold a certain amount of inventory using their respective 
warehouses but both of them nonetheless seek to minimize their individual inventory holding costs. When 
making the production-inventory plan within a stable sales cycle, the sales company (the leader) takes the 
lead in developing an optimal inventory plan which considers the current market demand and implicit 
reactions of other decision entities. The logistics center (the middle-level follower) then makes an optimal 
inventory plan under the decision given by the sales company and considers the implicit production planning 
of the manufacturing factory (the bottom-level follower). Lastly, the manufacturing factory makes the 
production plan to minimize its own cost of production in light of the fixed inventory plans. The decision 
process will not stop until the Stackelberg equilibrium among the decision entities is achieved. Consequently, 
the example describes a typical tri-level decision-making problem in which decisions are sequentially and 
repeatedly executed with all decision entities seeking to optimize their individual objectives until the 
Stackelberg equilibrium is achieved. 
In general, there are two fundamental issues in supporting such a tri-level decision-making process. One 
is how to use a model to describe the decision-making process, which may manifest different characteristics 
at the three decision levels, and the other is how to find an optimal solution to the problem. Whereas the 
majority of studies on multilevel programming were focused on bi-level decision-making (also known as 
bi-level programming) such as in [3, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 17, 31, 35], research on tri-level decision-making has 
increasingly attracted investigations into decision models, solution algorithms and applications since it can 
be used to deal with many decentralized decision problems in the real world. Bard [4] first presented an 
investigation of linear tri-level programming and designed a cutting plane algorithm to solve such problems, 
based on which White [32] proposed a penalty function approach for linear tri-level programming problems. 
Faísca, Saraiva, Rustem and Pistikopoulos [11] studied a multi-parametric programming approach to solve 
tri-level hierarchical and decentralized optimization problems. Yao, Edmunds, Papageorgiou and Alvarez 
[34] built a tri-level optimization model for resource allocation in electric power network defense and 
proposed a decomposition approach to find an optimal solution to the model. Recently, Alguacil, Delgadillo 
and Arroyo [1] adopted a tri-level decision model to describe an electric grid defense planning problem and 
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solved it using a novel two-stage solution approach. Street, Moreira and Arroyo [27] developed a tri-level 
decision model for energy reserve scheduling in electricity markets with transmission flow limits and found a 
solution to it by a Benders decomposition approach. 
Although numerous studies have been carried out, existing tri-level decision-making research has been 
primarily limited to a specific situation in which one single decision entity is involved at each level. 
However, more decision entities are often involved at the middle and bottom levels in a tri-level 
decision-making case; these entities are called multiple followers. In the production-inventory planning 
example, the sales company (the leader) may have several subordinate logistics centers (the middle-level 
followers) and there may also be several manufacturing factories (the bottom-level followers) attached to 
each logistics center. Moreover, multiple followers at the same level may have a variety of relationships with 
one another. In our previous research [18], we developed 64 kinds of standard situations to describe various 
relationships within multi-follower tri-level (MFTL) decision problems, such as the uncooperative 
relationship, cooperative relationship, and semi-cooperative relationship. Such diverse relationships among 
multiple followers will generate different decision processes which need to be described and solved using 
different decision models and solution methods. As almost no research on MFTL decision-making has been 
proposed apart from some limited discussion about programming models [18, 23], further investigation into 
MFTL decision models together with solution methods is necessary and urgent. Furthermore, MFTL 
decision techniques in real-world applications are crucially required. 
This study considers an uncooperative situation where multiple followers at the same level make their 
individual decisions independently but exchange information among themselves, which implies that 
followers consider the decision results of their counterparts as references when making their individual 
decisions. The situation is known as a reference-based uncooperative (or reference-uncooperative) 
relationship, which is very common and popular among competitive or uncooperative decision entities in 
some hierarchical organizations. For example, in the proposed production-inventory planning instance, the 
independent logistics centers and factories may reference inventory or production plans determined by their 
counterparts at the same level when making their individual decisions. More specifically, within MFTL 
decision-making, if multiple followers at the same level determine their individual decision variables 
independently but simultaneously take the decision results of their counterparts for references to optimize 
their respective objectives, this can be called a reference-uncooperative MFTL decision problem. Solving 
this kind of MFTL decision problem implies that we need to find an optimal solution known as a 
Stackelberg-Nash solution to achieve not only the Stackelberg equilibrium in the tri-level vertical structure 
but also the Nash equilibrium among multiple followers at the same horizontal level. To support such a 
decision-making process, this paper will model this reference-uncooperative MFTL decision situation and 
find an optimal solution to the model. 
 In addition, the optimal solution only means a compromised result for a MFTL decision problem, which 
cannot reflect the operations of the complex MFTL decision-making process completely; that is, it is 
imprecise or ambiguous for decision entities to evaluate the solution obtained whether or not they desire to in 
real-world cases. It is necessary to find a practical way to identify the satisfaction of decision entities towards 
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the solution obtained by the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm. In terms of related research, Lai [15], Shih, Lai and 
Lee [23] and Sinha [24, 25] have developed fuzzy approaches to identify the satisfaction of decision entities 
and have obtained solutions to multilevel programming problems. Pramanik and Roy [21] have proposed 
another fuzzy approach using linear goal programming to solve such problems. However, these fuzzy 
approaches are limited to a special situation where decision entities from different levels share the same 
constraint conditions with each other and the solutions obtained are not the compromised equilibrium. This 
study will overcome this existing issue and extend these fuzzy programming approaches to evaluate the 
solution obtained and analyze the decision-making process in the uncooperative MFTL decision situation. 
The main contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it provides a general decision model and a solution 
method with related algorithm to solve reference-uncooperative MFTL decision problems; and second, it 
adopts a fuzzy programming approach to identify the satisfaction of decision entities towards the solution 
obtained. We first present a linear MFTL decision model for the reference-uncooperative situation and 
discusses related theoretical properties of the model. A MFTL Kth-Best algorithm is then developed to find 
an optimal solution to the MFTL decision model and a fuzzy programming approach is used to evaluate the 
solution obtained. Lastly, a detailed case study on production-inventory planning illustrates the proposed 
MFTL decision-making techniques in applications. 
The paper is organized as follows. Following the introduction, a general linear reference-uncooperative 
MFTL decision model along with related theoretical properties are presented in Section 2. In Section 3, a 
MFTL Kth-Best algorithm is proposed to find an optimal solution to the model. We then use a fuzzy 
programming approach to analyze the satisfactory degree of decision entities towards obtained solutions in 
Section 4. A case study and a related decision support system on production-inventory planning illustrate our 
research in Section 5. Lastly, in Section 6, concluding remarks and further avenues of study are given. 
2. Multi-follower tri-level decision model and related properties 
This section will present the developed reference-uncooperative MFTL decision model and discuss 
related theoretical properties. 
2.1. A general reference-uncooperative MFTL decision model and related solution concepts 
The organizational structure among decision entities in the three-level hierarchy that is studied in this 























Fig. 1. The organizational structure of the three-level hierarchy 
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Let kRXx  , ikii RYy  ,
ijk
ijij RZz   denote the vectors of decision variables of the leader, the 
middle-level follower i, and the bottom-level follower ij respectively where nimj i ,,2,1,,,2,1   . We give 
detailed definitions of the reference-uncooperative relationship as follows. 
Definition 2.1 If the decision variables nii yyyy ,,,,, 111   controlled by the counterparts of the 
middle-level follower i  are involved in its the objective function and constraint conditions apart from its 
own decision variable iy and the decision variables iimi zzx ,,, 1  determined by the leader and the 
bottom-level followers, this is a reference-uncooperative relationship among multiple followers at the middle 
level. 
Definition 2.2 If the decision variables 
iimjijii
zzzz ,,,,, )1()1(1    controlled by the counterparts of the 
bottom-level follower ij  are involved in its objective function and constraint conditions apart from its own 
decision variable ijz and the decision variables x and iy respectively determined by the leader and the 
middle-level follower i, this can be called a reference-uncooperative relationship among multiple 
bottom-level followers attached to the same middle-level follower i. 
As we can see from Definitions 2.1 and 2.2, the reference-uncooperative relationship implies that each 
decision entity at the middle or bottom level should consider decision results made by its counterparts as 
references when determining its own decision variable to optimize its individual objective function. Based on 
the definitions, we propose a general linear MFTL decision model together with the reference-uncooperative 
relationship among both middle-level and bottom-level followers. 
For kRXx  , ikii RYy  ,
ijk
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where kiji Rccc ,, ,
ik
iji Rpd , ,
sk
is Rg  ,
ijk
ijij Rhe , ,
itk
ijt Rq  ,
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for ,,,2,1 imj  ,,,2,1 imt   
nsni ,,2,1,,,2,1   . 
To find a Stackbelberg-Nash solution to the MFTL decision model (1), relevant solution concepts are 
defined as follows based on the MFTL hierarchical structure. 
Definition 2.3 
(a) Constraint region of the MFTL decision model (1): 
,:),,,,,,,,,,{(
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 (e) Rational reaction set of all the bottom-level followers attached to the middle-level follower i 
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Based on related solution concepts, it can be concluded that the reference-uncooperative MFTL decision 
model has the following features: (1) there are reference-uncooperative relationships among both multiple 
middle-level followers and multiple bottom-level followers attached to the same middle-level follower; (2) 
the leader has the priority to determine its decision variable x to optimize its objective function under the 
constraint region S; (3) the middle-level follower i then determines its individual decision variable iy  under 
the feasible set ),,,,,,( 111 niii yyyyxS    to react to the given decision ),,,,,,( 111 nii yyyyx    from 
the leader and other middle-level followers; (4) the bottom-level follower ij determines its decision variable 
ijz under its feasible set ),,,,,,,( )1()1(1 iimjijiiiij zzzzyxS   to respond to the decision 
),,,,,,,( )1()1(1 iimjijiii zzzzyx    
made by the leader, the middle-level follower i and its own counterparts; 
(5) since each decision entity seeks to optimize its own objective function, the decision variable selection of 
the bottom-level follower ij must be involved in its rational reaction set ),,,,,,,( )1()1(1 iimjijiiiij zzzzyxP   , 
which ensures an optimal solution to problem (1e-1f) under the given decision 
),,,,,,,( )1()1(1 iimjijiii zzzzyx   ; (6) as the decision of the middle-level follower i is affected by actions of 
its bottom-level followers, it must consider implicit reactions of its bottom-level followers when making its 
own decisions, thus, a Stackelberg-Nash solution ),,,( 1 iimii zzy   
to the middle-level follower i and its 
bottom-level followers must occur in their rational reaction set ),,,,,,( 111 niii yyyyxP   , which can also be 
considered as an optimal solution to problem (1c-1f) under the given decision ),,,,,,( 111 nii yyyyx   ; (7) 
a Stackelberg-Nash solution to all the followers under the given x by the leader must be involved in 
:),,,,,,,,,{()( 11111 1 nnmnmn zzzzyyxP  },,2,1),,,,,,,(),,,( 1111 niyyyyxPzzy niiiimii i    ; (8) as the 
leader should consider implicit reactions of all the followers when making its own decisions, an optimal 
solution (also known as a Stackelberg-Nash solution) to model (1) must occur over the inducible region (IR) 
and the optimal solution set is expressed by OS. 
2.2. Related theoretical properties 
For the sake of developing an efficient algorithm to solve the MFTL decision model (1), we now turn our 
attention to the geometry of the solution space shown as the following theoretical properties of model (1). To 
ensure that the model (1) is well posed, it is necessary to make some assumptions about the MFTL decision 
model as the basis for the existence of solutions. 
(1) S is nonempty and compact. 
(2) IR is nonempty. 
(3) ),( ii yxP  and )(xP  have at most one solution respectively for each parameter ),( iyx  and x, where 
ni ,,2,1  . 
Theorem 2.1 If the above assumptions (1-3) hold, there exists an optimal solution to the MFTL decision 
model (1). 
Proof. Since both S and IR are not empty, there is at least one parameter value x
 
and  )(xP . Consider 
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among all the 
middle-level and bottom-level followers are uniquely determined respectively for the given value ),(  iyx  
and 
x , which implies that the leader must optimize its objective over IR. According to the optimal solution 







            (2) 
Therefore, problem (2) consists of minimizing a continuous function over a nonempty and compact set IR, 
which implies that there exists an optimal solution to the problem (2) that is also a Stackelberg-Nash solution 
to the MFTL decision model (1). □ 
It is noticeable from the Theorem 2.1 that if the followers have multiple optimal solutions to respond to 
the parameter value x of the leader, it will be difficult for the leader to realize its objective function value 
prior to the determination of the optimal solution taken by the followers [19]. In this case, if the followers 
cannot select the solution preferred by the leader, the leader may achieve its optimal solution outside IR, 
which implies that the MFTL decision model (1) may not have an optimal solution. Therefore, to avoid this 
situation in the presentation of solution algorithms, the assumption (3) is necessary. 
Theorem 2.2 The IR can be expressed equivalently as a piecewise linear equality constraint comprised of 
supporting hyperplanes of S. 
Proof. First, define 
)},,,,,,,,(:min{),,,,,,,( )1()1(1)1()1(1 ii imjijiiiijijijijjimjijiiiij zzzzyxSzzqzzzzyxF   
 











                       .,,2,1},,,2,1),ˆ,,ˆ,ˆ,,ˆ,ˆ,(ˆ )1()1(1 nimjzzzzyxFzq iimjijiiiijijijj i     
Since ),,,,,,,( )1()1(1 iimjijiiiij zzzzyxF    can be seen as a linear programming problem with parameters 











         
 (3) 
If both ),,,,,,,( )1()1(1 iimjijiiiij zzzzyxF    
and problem (3) have feasible solutions, according to the dual 
9 
theorem of linear programming, both of them have optimal solutions and the same optimal objective function 
value. We know that a solution to problem (3) occurs at a vertex of its constraint region
}0,:{(  ijijjijijjijij uquQuU . Adopting 
ijk
ijijij uuu ,,,
21   to express all the vertices of ijU , problem (3) 
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Clearly, ),,,,,,,( )1()1(1 iimjijiiiij zzzzyxF    is a piecewise linear function according to problem (4). 















iimii zzzzzz   
are solutions to the problem },,2,1),,,,,,,,({ )1()1(1 iimjijiiiij mjzzzzyxF i    
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niii yyyyxF   . Considering different 
































niii yyyyxF    is 
also a piecewise linear function as ),,,,,,,( )1()1(1 iimjijiiiij zzzzyxF   . Lastly, according to the above 
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and it can be seen as a piecewise linear equality constraint for problem (2). □ 
Corollary 2.1 The MFTL decision model (1) is equivalent to optimizing 
)1(f  over a feasible region 
comprised of a piecewise linear equality constraint. 
Corollary 2.2 An optimal solution to the MFTL decision model (1) occurs at a vertex of IR. 




zzzzyyxf   is linear, an optimal solution to the problem must occur at a 
vertex of IR if it exists. □ 
Theorem 2.3 An optimal solution ),,,,,,,,,,( 11111 1

nnmnmn
zzzzyyx   to the MFTL decision model (1) 
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occurs at a vertex of S. 
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niii yyyyxF  , let us write the constraints of 
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i   

 
.,,2,1 ni   These statements imply 











 tr ,,2,1  , and that ),,,,,,,,,,( 11111 1

nnmnmn
zzzzyyx   can 
be denoted as a convex combination of the points in the IR. Since ),,,,,,,,,,( 11111 1

nnmnmn
zzzzyyx   is a 




zzzzyyx   is a vertex of S. □ 





is a vertex of the IR, it is also a vertex of S. 
3. A MFTL Kth-Best algorithm 
Theorem 2.3 and Corollary 2.3 imply that we can find an optimal solution to the MFTL decision model (1) 
by enumerating vertices (also called extreme points) of the constraint region S, which clearly provide an 
appropriate way to develop the following MFTL Kth-Best algorithm to solve the problem. According to the 
notations and theoretical foundation respectively defined and demonstrated in Section 2, the main principle 
of the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm is proposed as follows. 
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k ii  . Solving the equivalent problem (2) of 






















zzzzyyx   is an optimal solution 
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is an optimal solution to the problem 
































),,,,,,,,,,( 11111 1   by 
Definition 2.3(g). As this requires finding the K th best vertex of S to obtain an optimal solution to model 
(1), the algorithm is named the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm. 
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through 
solving problem (1c-1f). For ni ,,2,1 
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ii yyyy ,,11  , consider the following linear 
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iimii zzyzzy  of ),,,,,,( 111 niii yyyyxS    become the ranked 













































i zhygygxc ,1,,2,1  ii Nk  ni ,,2,1  . Solving problem (8) is then equivalent 













































ii zzyzzy  , 
















i yyyyxPzzy i  . 
Before the detailed procedures of the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm are presented, the notations and indexes 
used in the algorithm are explained in Table 1. 
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Table 1 Notations and indexes used in the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm 
k Current iteration number for solving the MFTL decision model (1) 
T The feasible vertices set of the constraint region S that has been searched for solving model (1) 
W The feasible vertices set of the constraint region S that needs to be searched for solving model (1) 
i The ith middle-level follower 
n The total number of middle-level followers 
kW  











zzzzyyx   over S 
K  The iteration number when finding an optimal solution to model (1) 
ik  
Current iteration number for solving problem (1c-1f) involving the ith middle-level follower and its 
bottom-level followers 
iT  
The feasible vertices set of ),,,,,,( 111 niii yyyyxS    that has been searched for solving problem (1c-1f) 
iW   The feasible vertices set of ),,,,,,( 111 niii yyyyxS    that needs to be searched for solving problem (1c-1f) 
j The jth bottom-level follower attached to the ith middle-level follower 












i zzy   over ),,,,,,( 111 niii yyyyxS    

iK  The iteration number when finding an optimal solution to problem (1c-1f) 
 
The MFTL Kth-Best algorithm: The input is the coefficients of model (1), and the output is an optimal 
solution to model (1) and the iteration number K . 
[Begin] 




















zzzzyyxW  . Set i=1 and go to Step 2. 







kk yyyyyyyyxx   ,,,,,, 111111  , solve the problem (1c-1f) or problem (8) 
and obtain an optimal solution )ˆ,,ˆ,ˆ( 1 iimii zzy   using the following subroutine Step 2.1-Step 2.5. 
Then go to Step 3. 
Step 2.1: Set 




















zzyW  . Set j=1 and go to Step 2.2. 












k zzzzzzzzyyxx   ,,,,,,, )1()1()1()1(11   and adopt 








itijtiijij zzzzyxSzzqypxc  

           (10) 
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and obtain the optimal solution ijz
~ . 
Step 2.3: If i
ik
ijij zz 
~ , go to Step 2.4. If i
ik
ijij zz 
~  and imj  , set j=j+1 and go to Step 2.2. If 
iik
ijij zz 
~  and imj  , stop the subroutine, ii kK 











iimii zzyzzy   . 
Step 2.4: Let 
ik



















































iii zzyTT   and ikii TWWW i \)(  . Go to Step 2.5. 


















































Set j=1 and go to Step 2.2. 














zzyzzy    and ni  , set 



















zzzzyyx   is an optimal solution to the MFTL decision model (1) and 
kK  . 











zzzzyyx   such that 





































zzzzyyxTT   and TWWW k \)(  . Go to Step 5. 















































Set i=1 and go to Step 2. 
[End] 
Within the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm, Step 2 and its subroutine (Step 2.1-2.5) are adopted to obtain an 
optimal solution to problem (1c-1f) of the ith middle-level follower and its bottom-level followers under the 
given decision ),,,,,,( 111 nii yyyyx    from the leader and other middle-level followers. Step 3 is 
repeatedly performed to see whether or not the current vertex is an element involved in the IR. If the current 
vertex occurs outside IR, the algorithm will go to Step 4 in which the adjacent vertices of the current vertex 
will be found and added to the vertices set W that needs to be searched. Step 5 is developed to choose a 
vertex from the vertices set W to optimize the objective function of problem (7) and prepare for the next 
iteration to verify whether or not the vertex is an element of the IR. 
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We then use a simple numerical example, shown as the following Example 1, to illustrate how the MFTL 
Kth-Best algorithm works. Also, we will illustrate the algorithm through a case study in Section 5. 
Example 1 We assume that the example involves one leader, two middle-level followers and two 
bottom-level followers attached to each middle-level follower, which means that 2,2 21  mmn  in 
model (1).  For }0:{},0:{},0:{  ijijijiii zzZyyYxxX , ,2,1j 2,1i , coefficients of the decision 
variables in model (1) are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 Coefficients of model (1) in Example 1 
Decision entity 
Coefficients of model (1) 























































































Detailed procedures of the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm that are executed to solve the example 1 are shown 
as follows. 
Iteration 1 
Step 1: Set k=1 and adopt the simplex method to obtain an optimal solution to the following linear 
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1 zzzzyyx and now T , 
W={(1,1,0.5,0.5,4.5,0,2)}. Set i=1 and go to Step 2. 
Step 2: Put 1
1  xx , 5.0122  yy and solve the problem (12) of the middle-level follower i(=1) and its 













                         (12) 
We can get an optimal solution (1,2,3)=)ˆ,ˆ,ˆ( 12111 zzy  by Steps 2.1-2.5 of the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm and 
go to Step 3. 
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112111 zzyzzy   and go to Step 4. 













1 zzzzyyx  and now ),5.2,0,4,1,5.0,1,1{(1 W
)}5.2,0,4,2,5.0,1,0(),2,0,5.3,5.2,5.1,1,0(),2,0,3,2,5.0,1,1(),5.1,1,3,2,5.0,1,1( , )}2,0,5.4,5.0,5.0,1,1{()}2,0,5.4,5.0,5.0,1,1{(  TT , 
11 \ WTWWW   . Go to Step 5. 
Iteration 2 





































, set i=1 and 
go to Step 2. 
Step 2: Put 1
2  xx , 5.0222  yy  and solve the problem (12). We can get an optimal solution 
(1,2,3)=)ˆ,ˆ,ˆ( 12111 zzy  by Steps 2.1-2.5 of the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm and go to Step 3. 




112111 zzyzzy   and go to Step 4. 













2 zzzzyyx  and now
)}5.2,0,3,3,5.1,1,0(),5.2,0,3,2,5.0,1,1{(2 W , )}5.2,0,4,1,5.0,1,1(),2,0,5.4,5.0,5.0,1,1{()}5.2,0,4,1,5.0,1,1{(  TT , 
),5.2,0,3,2,5.0,1,1(),5.2,0,4,2,5.0,1,0(),2,0,5.3,5.2,5.1,1,0(),2,0,3,2,5.0,1,1(),5.1,1,3,2,5.0,1,1{(\2  TWWW 
)}5.2,0,3,3,5.1,1,0( . Go to Step 5. 
Iteration 3 











3 zzzzyyx  


























, set i=1 and go 
to Step 2. 
Step 2: Put 1
3  xx , 5.0322  yy and solve the problem (12). We can get an optimal solution 
(1,2,3)=)ˆ,ˆ,ˆ( 12111 zzy  by Steps 2.1-2.5 of the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm and go to Step 3. 




112111 zzyzzy   , and ni  , set i=i+1=2 and go to Step 2. 
Step 2: Put 1
3  xx , 1311  yy and solve the problem (13) of the middle-level follower i(=2) and its 













                         (13) 
We can get an optimal solution )(0.5,1,1.5=)ˆ,ˆ,ˆ( 22212 zzy  by Steps 2.1-2.5 of the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm 
and go to Step 3. 

















3 zzzzyyx  
is an optimal solution to the example 1 and the iteration number 3 kK . 
We finally find an optimal solution to the Example 1 through three iterations, which means that we 













)1(  fffffff . As we can see from the simple 
numerical example, the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm provides a convenient way to solve this kind of 
reference-uncooperative MFTL decision problem. However, there are still two practical issues in applying 
the proposed MFTL decision model and Kth-Best algorithm to deal with MFTL decision cases in the real 
world. One is that it is imprecise or ambiguous for decision entities to evaluate a solution whether or not 
decision entities desire this through their respective objective values; the other is that it remains difficult and 
inefficient to find an optimal manual solution if we have to search a mass of vertices using the MFTL 
Kth-Best algorithm. Therefore, it is becoming necessary and urgent to propose an approach to recognize the 
satisfactory degree of decision entities towards solutions, and develop a decision support system driven by 
the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm to assist decision makers in solving such MFTL decision problems accurately 
and efficiently. To overcome these issues, an evaluation approach of solutions using fuzzy programming will 
be proposed in Section 4. In Section 5, we will deal with a real-world reference-uncooperative MFTL 
decision problem by means of a tri-level decision support system driven by the proposed MFTL decision 
techniques. 
4. Evaluation of solutions 
We are able to find an optimal solution for the MFTL decision model (1) using the proposed MFTL 
Kth-Best algorithm based on related theoretical properties. However, it is difficult to illustrate the operations 
of the complex MFTL decision-making process by the optimal solution defined by Definition 2.3 because the 
solution only represents the decision result rather than the decision process. In this section, we will use a 
fuzzy programming approach to evaluate the solution obtained and illustrate why decision entities have to 
achieve and accept the final result during the MFTL decision-making process. 
Within a MFTL decision-making process, each decision entity seeks to optimize its own objective but its 
decision is affected by actions of others, thus, decision entities achieve a compromised result with a possible 
relaxation rather than their individual best solutions as desired. Since it is imprecise or ambiguous for 
decision entities to identify a compromised result whether or not they desire it, the objective functions can be 




to denote the 
individual best and worst results respectively that a decision entity may achieve. Finally, the compromised 
objective value of the decision entity must be involved in the interval ],[ maxmin ff . Therefore, we can elicit 
membership functions )( f  to characterize fuzzy goals over the domain ],[ maxmin ff for the objective 
functions, which can also be adopted to describe the satisfactory degree of decision entities towards a 
solution or an objective value. For example, a decision entity specifies the objective value 0f
 
such that the 
satisfactory degree is 0, that is 0)( 0 f , while the value 1f of the objective function such that 1)( 1 f  
means that the satisfactory degree is 1. Clearly, if an objective value f is undesired (larger) than 0f , it is 
defined that 0)( f ; whereas 1)( f  if an objective value f is desired (smaller) than 
1f . In this 




are specified as max0 ff 
 
and min1 ff  , 
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and that the membership functions are linear versions shown as Fig. 2 although they do not always need to 
be linear. Also, note that in this research the satisfactory degree 1)( f  if there exists 






Fig. 2. Linear membership function 
(1)The membership function of the leader 






   






   
The corresponding linear membership function )( )1(f
 































                                (14) 
)( )1(f
 
can be used to denote the satisfactory degree of the leader towards an objective value )1(f . 
0)( 0 f
 
implies that the satisfactory degree of the leader is 0 when the objective value 0)1( ff  , while 
the objective value 1)1( ff 
 
such that 1)( 1 f
 
means that the satisfactory degree of the leader becomes 
1. 
(2) The membership function of the middle-level follower i ),,2,1( ni   






nii yyyyx   










  niiiimiiiminiiiiii yyyyxSzzyzzyyyyyxfff ii   



















































                              (15) 
We can use )( )2(ii f  to denote the satisfactory degree of the middle-level follower i towards an 
objective value )2(if . 0)(
0 ii f  implies that the satisfactory degree of the middle-level follower i is 0 
when the objective value 0)2( ii ff  , whereas the objective value 
1)2(
ii ff   such that 1)(
1 ii f  means 
that the satisfactory degree becomes 1. 
(3) The membership function of the bottom-level follower ij ),,2,1,,,2,1( nimj i    








zzzzyx   from the leader, the middle-level follower i and its own counterparts, 












zzzzyxSzzzzzzyxfff   












zzzzyxSzzzzzzyxfff   
The corresponding linear membership function )(
)3(
ijij f  






































                               (16) 
We can also use )( )3(ijij f  




0 ijij f  
implies that the satisfactory degree is 0 when the objective value 
0)3(
ijij ff  , while the objective value 
1)3(
ijij ff   such that 1)(
1 ijij f  
means that the satisfactory degree is 
1. 
We use the proposed approach to evaluate the solutions enumerated in Example 1. For the leader, 
3)2,0,5.4,5.0,5.0,1,1()1(min1  fff
 
and 5.9)5.2,0,3,3,5.0,1,0()1(max0  fff , thus, by the formula 































3 zzyyx  
)5.1,1,3,2,5.0,1,1(), 322
3
21 zz . By the formulas (15) and (16), the satisfactory degrees of multiple followers 
towards each solution are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3 Objective values and corresponding satisfactory degrees of decision entities in Example 1 
Vertex 
Leader Follower 1 Follower 2 Follower 11 Follower 12 Follower 21 Follower 22 
)1(f   )( )1(f  )2(1f  )(
)2(
11 f  
)2(
2f
 )( )2(22 f  
)3(
11f
 )( )3(1111 f  
)3(
12f
 )( )3(1212 f  
)3(
21f
 )( )3(2121 f  
)3(
22f
 )( )3(2222 f  
)2,0,5.4,5.0,5.0,1,1(  3.0   1.0 5.5   1.0 3.0   1.0 7.5   0.83 8.0   1.0 3.5    0 0   0.80 
)5.2,0,4,1,5.0,1,1(  3.5   0.92 5.5   1.0 3.5   0.67 8.0   0.67 8.0   1.0 4.0    0 -0.5  1.0 
)5.1,1,3,2,5.0,1,1(  5.5   0.62 5.5   1.0 3.5   0.67 9.0   1.0 8.0   1.0 0     1.0 2.5  1.0 











1 zzzzyyx  
is the individual best 
solution to the leader such that the satisfactory degree is 1.0, thus the leader anticipates that the followers can 
select )2,0,5.4,5.0,5.0,1(),,,,,( 2221121121 zzzzyy  to respond to its own decision 1x . Under the decision
1x  given by the leader, the middle-level followers make their decisions )5.0,1(),( 21 yy  as desired by 
the leader, and they also desire that the bottom-level followers can react to the given decision
)5.0,1,1(),,( 21 yyx  by determining 
)2,0,5.4,5.0(),,,( 22211211 zzzz  because their satisfactory degrees are 
both 1.0 under the solution. However, in view of the given decision by the leader and the middle-level 
follower 1, the bottom-level followers 11 and 12 will not choose the decision )5.4,5.0(),( 1211 zz  that are 
desired by the leader and the middle-level follower 1 since they still have space to optimize their objectives 
and improve their satisfactory degrees. Thus, )5.4,5.0(),( 1211 zz  is not an optimal solution to the 
bottom-level followers 11 and 12 and they will select )3,2(),( 1211 zz  to achieve the highest satisfactory 
degree 1.0, which also is the Nash equilibrium between them under the decision made by the leader and the 
middle-level follower 1. Similarly, the bottom-level followers 21 and 22 will make the decision 
)5.1,1(),( 2221 zz  to respond to the leader and the middle-level follower 2. The leader and the middle-level 
followers have to reduce their individual satisfactory degrees to bend to the increase in the satisfactory 
degrees of the bottom-level followers throughout the MFTL decision-making process. In this way, the 











3 zzzzyyx , under 
which the satisfactory degrees of all the bottom-level followers go up to 1.0. 
Although the satisfactory degrees of the leader and the middle-level follower 2 drop to 0.62 and 0.67 
respectively, the numbers become the highest satisfactory degrees for them under the Stackelberg-Nash 
equilibrium and the uncooperative relationship among all decision entities. In real-world cases, the situation 
indicates that higher satisfactory degrees of the leader and the middle-level follower 2 cannot be achieved 
under the current decision conditions unless they may persuade the bottom-level followers to cooperate with 
them and to reduce the corresponding satisfactory degrees. For example, if the bottom-level followers 11, 21 
and 22 are willing to accept their respective satisfactory degrees 0.83, 0 and 0.80, the solution to Example 1 











1 zzzzyyx , which ensures that the corresponding satisfactory 
degrees the leader and the bottom-level follower 2 rise up to 1.0. Otherwise, they have to adjust the current 
decision context through changing objective functions or constraint conditions to generate a new round of the 
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decision-making process. We will illustrate how to adopt the evaluation criterion to deal with real-world 
MFTL decision problems through a case study in the following Section 5. 
5. A case study: Production-inventory planning 
In this section, we will use a case study on production-inventory planning to illustrate the proposed 
MFTL decision techniques. 
5.1. Case description 
Nowadays, manufacturers usually work in a distributed or decentralized manner in a complex supply 
chain network comprising of suppliers, sales and logistics companies, customers and other specialized 
service functions [7]. Researchers as well as practitioners in manufacturing industries have placed 
importance on developing production and inventory control capabilities to enhance their market position in 
supply chain management [22], which demands that manufacturing enterprises have to make right decisions 
on scheduling of their production and allocation of inventory to satisfy market requirements, shorten delivery 
time and reduce total production costs [2, 8, 28]. Therefore, it is increasingly important to have efficient and 
easily-applicable models and solution methods to describe and solve related production-inventory decision 
problems [6, 13] although modeling deception in a real-world conflict situation is usually difficult [16]. 
In this section, we adopt the proposed MFTL decision techniques to handle a production-inventory 
planning problem within a real-world conglomerate enterprise. The conglomerate is composed of a sales 
company, two logistics centers and two manufacturing factories attached to each logistics center, which are 
distributed throughout a three-stage hierarchical supply chain. The three-level hierarchical structure of the 
conglomerate is shown in Fig. 3. Specifically, the sales company covers products marketing of the enterprise 
and has an independent products warehouse to satisfy market demand and shorten time-to-market. Both 
logistics centers also hold a certain amount of products inventory to respond to market requirements and 
reduce the inventory pressure of the sales company. According to market requirements and the holding 
inventories of the sales company and the logistics centers, the manufacturing factories are responsible for the 
production organization involving making detailed production plans and executing production activities. 
.Sales Company
.Logistics center 1 .Logistics center 2
.Factory 11 .Factory 12 .Factory 21 .Factory 22
 
Fig. 3. Hierarchical structure of the conglomerate enterprise 
The decision situation we study in this paper is described as follows. During a peak season of products 
sales, the market requirements exceed the normal supply capacity of the enterprise so that four 
manufacturing factories have to organize overtime production. The sum of overtime outputs produced by 
four factories and safety stocks held by the sales company and two logistics centers are demanded to satisfy 
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the exceeded market requirements. The more safety stocks imply the fewer overtime production outputs, but 
also mean the more inventory holding costs. Under the given market requirements, the decision entities 
distributed throughout the three-level hierarchy try to minimize their individual costs by considering their 
own constraints and implicit decisions made by other decision entities. More specifically, the sales company 
at the top level has the priority to determine its safety stock to minimize its inventory holding cost by 
considering the given market requirements and implicit reactions of other decision entities. In view of the 
decision made by the sales company, the logistics centers at the middle level then determine their individual 
safety stocks to minimize their own inventory holding costs by considering their own constraints and implicit 
reactions of their subordinate factories. Finally, each manufacturing factory at the bottom level makes 
overtime production plans in the light of the inventories held by the top and middle levels. 
Furthermore, to reduce the total cost of the conglomerate, the conglomerate anticipates that decision 
entities whose inventory holding cost or overtime production cost is lower are able to keep more inventories 
or manufacture more production outputs. Thus, the conglomerate makes some management strategies to 
intervene and reconcile the decision process of its subordinate decision entities. For example, the 
conglomerate claims that each logistics center should take the inventory determined by the other logistics 
center as a reference when making its own decisions. If the inventory of a logistics center is less than the 
other, it means the less inventory holding cost but implies that the logistics center is demanded to undertake 
an opportunity cost for its own decision on holding less inventory. Also, each factory needs to reference the 
production plans made by other counterparts attached to the same logistics center when making its own 
production plans. If the production outputs of a factory are less than the other, it means the less overtime 
production costs but implies that the factory needs to cover an opportunity cost for its own decision on less 
production outputs. In addition, the sales company is demanded to afford the marketing cost and backlogging 
cost of the conglomerate. However, to reduce the total cost to the sales company, the conglomerate demands 
that both logistics centers must share part of the inventory holding cost and compensate for the marketing 
cost of the sales company. Similarly, to reduce the pressure of overtime production, the factories at the 
bottom level are also demanded to compensate the inventory holding cost of their superior logistics center to 
encourage it to keep more safety stocks. Therefore, under the current decision situation, the decision entities 
will try to minimize their individual overall costs by making their individual decisions, and the decision 
processes are executed sequentially, interactively and repeatedly within the tri-level hierarchy until the 
Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium is achieved among them. 
This case clearly describes a MFTL decision process which includes one leader (the sales company), two 
middle-level followers (the logistics centers) and two bottom-level followers (the manufacturing factories) 
attached to each middle-level follower. The leader, the middle-level followers and the bottom-level followers 
make their individual decisions in sequence, and each decision entity cannot control decisions of the others 
but is affected by their reactions. It is noticeable that the multiple middle-level and bottom-level followers 
also consider decisions made by their counterparts as references, which implies a reference-uncooperative 
relationship among the multiple followers at both the middle and bottom levels. The case can thus be 
considered as a reference-uncooperative MFTL decision problem. 
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In the light of the above problem description, let n=2 be the number of logistics centers, and i be the index 
for logistics centers, 2,1i ; while let 2im be the number of manufacturing factories attached to the 
logistics center i, and j be the index for manufacturing factories, 2,1j . To model the problem 
conveniently, related notations of decision variables and some key parameters in the scenario are shown in 
Table 4. 
Table 4 Symbols for decision variables and parameters employed 
Symbols and Indexes 
x  The safety stock controlled by the sales company 
iy  The independent safety stock determined by the logistics center i 
ijz  
The overtime production plan determined by the factory ij 
iaa,  The inventory holding cost per unit of the sales company and the logistics center i 
ija  
The overtime production cost per unit afforded by the factory ij 
ibb,  
The marketing cost per unit of the sales company and the compensation cost per unit that the logistics 
center i has to pay for the marketing cost of the sales company 
c  The products backlogging cost per unit that is paid by the sales company 
iji dd ,  The opportunity cost per unit of the logistics center i and the factory ij 
iji eee ,,  
The proportion of the inventory holding cost of the sales company that is respectively shared by the 




i ee ,  
The proportion of the inventory holding cost of the logistics center i that is respectively shared by itself 
and the factory ij 
p  The exceeded products requirements of the market 
q  The minimum inventories sum of all safety stocks anticipated by the sales company 
iq  
The logistics center i must hold that the products sum of its own safety stock, the overtime production 
outputs of its lower-level factories and the safety stock of the sales company does not exceed iq  
ijq  
The factory ij must satisfy that the products sum comprised of its own and its counterparts’ production 
outputs and the safety stocks of the sales company and the logistics center i exceeds ijq  
irr,  The maximum safety stock of the sales company and the logistics center i 
ijr  
The maximum overtime production outputs of the factory ij 
 
5.2. Model building 
Based on the above decision conditions and strategies, the MFTL decision model of the case is 
established as follows in the form of the general model (1) proposed in Section 2.1. 




































,                                                        (17b) 






,                                                                (17c) 
    rx 0 .                                                                   (17d) 
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The sales company’s objective function (17a) involves its safety stock’s inventory holding cost aex, the 























ijii zyb derived from the logistics centers. Constraint condition (17b) means the upper bound of 
the products sum of all safety stocks and overtime production outputs of all manufacturing factories, while 
constraint condition (17c) implies the upper bound of the sum of all safety stocks. Constraint condition (17d) 
represents the lower and upper limits to the sales company’s safety stock. 




























,                                                          (17f) 
    ii ry 0 .                                                                  (17g) 
The objective function (17e) of the logistics center i involves its safety stock holding cost i
pw
ii yea , the 
opportunity cost ii yd  , the shared inventory holding cost xaei  of the sales company’s safety stock and the 







ijii zyb paid to the sales company. Note that 121 yyy  and 
212 yyy  . Constraint condition (17f) reflects the upper bound of the products sum consisting of all safety 
stocks and the overtime production outputs of the manufacturing factories attached to the middle-level 
follower i. Constraint condition (17g) represents the lower and upper limits to the safety stock of the logistics 
center i. 










)3(                                   (17h) 
s.t. ij
j




,                                                            (17i) 
    ijij rz 0 .                                                                 (17j) 
The objective function (17h) of the manufacturing factory ij involves its overtime production cost ijij za , 
the opportunity cost ijij zd  , and the shared inventory holding cost xaeij  and i
pw
iji yea  respectively for the 
safety stocks of the sales company and the logistics center i. Note that 121 iii zzz  and 212 iii zzz  . 
Constraint condition (17i) reflects the upper bound of the products sum consisting of overtime production 
outputs of the manufacturing factories attached to the logistics center i and safety stocks of the sales 
company and the logistics center i. Constraint condition (17j) represents the lower and upper limits to the 
overtime production outputs of the manufacturing factory ij. 
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This MFTL decision model (17) describes the real-world production and inventory decision problem 
which is a concretization of the general model (1) proposed in Section 2.1. We then adopt the MFTL 
Kth-Best algorithm to solve the model by a numerical experiment. 
5.3. Numerical experiment and results analysis 
This section shows the computational results achieved by the proposed MFTL Kth-Best algorithm and 
evaluation of solutions. The experimental data employed for the model (17) is provided in Tables 5-7. 
Table 5 Data for the sales company 
a  b  c  e  p  q  r  
5.0 2.0 2.0 0.20 9.0 3.5 2.5 
Table 6 Data for the logistics centers 







1 4.0 1.0 4.0 0.20 0.50 8.0 1.0 
2 4.0 3.0 4.0 0.20 0.50 6.0 0.50 
Table 7 Data for the manufacturing factories 
i  j  ij




ijq  ijr  
1 1 1.0 2.0 0.10 0.25 7.0 3.0 
1 2 3.0 2.0 0.10 0.25 7.0 3.0 
2 1 2.0 3.0 0.10 0.25 4.0 1.0 
2 2 4.0 3.0 0.10 0.25 4.0 2.0 
We use a tri-level decision support system to build the mathematics formula of model (17) based on the 
experimental data in Tables 5-7, shown as Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 4. Model building of the MFTL decision problem 
The tri-level decision support system driven by the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm then finds an optimal 
solution (also called a Stackelberg-Nash solution) to the model (17) shown in Fig. 5, which clearly shows 
that a solution is attained at the vertex ),,,,,,( 2221121121 zzzzyyx )5.0,1,1,3,5.0,1,2(  and the objective 
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values of all decision entities are 0.9)1( f , 0.7)2(1 f , 0.11
)2(
2 f , 0.1
)3(
11 f , 0.9
)3(
12 f , 0.2
)3(
21 f , 0.5
)3(
22 f . 
Fig. 5 also displays that an optimal solution is found after 12 iterations and the computing process has spent 
862 milliseconds of CPU time. 12 iterations imply that we must search 12 vertices at least to find an optimal 
solution, and this task would take a long time if the computing was conducted manually as well as solving 
the Example 1 in Section 3. The convenience of a decision support system is its very short computing time 
especially for solving complex MFTL decision problems in applications. Also, the decision support systems 
can output the detailed computing process driven by the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm, which can help us to 
analysis the satisfactory degree of decision entities towards solutions and can provide references for decision 
conditions adjustment in the real-world case. In addition, the web-based decision support system has another 
advantage that it can be integrated with other application systems commonly implemented in manufacturing 
enterprises, business organizations and governments, such as ERP, MES, e-business systems and common 
service platforms, which provides an opportunity to share data with other systems and support the 
decision-making of other systems. In this way, the tri-level decision support system is able to be a convenient 
means of decision-making in applications. 
 
Fig. 5. Computing results display of the MFTL decision problem 
The detailed computing process driven by the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm is shown in Table 8 which 
includes related data and parameters generated in the computing process. Specifically, Table 8 presents the 
vertex ks that is searched in the current iteration k, and the adjacent vertices set kW of the current vertex
ks . 
T represents the set of vertices that have been searched in the past iterations while W is the set of vertices that 
are needed to verify whether or not an optimal solution occurs inside in the following iteration. Following 
procedures of the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm, we finally obtain an optimal solution after 12 iterations. Note 
that 7W , 8W and 10W in Table 8 do not mean that adjacent vertices of 
87 , ss and 10s do not 
exist, but imply that their adjacent vertices have been found in previous iterations and have been involved in 
26 
W. 
Table 8 The detailed computing process of the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm 
Iteration k ),,,,,,( 2221121121
kkkkkkkk zzzzyyxs   kW
 T W 







1s } 1W  





{ 21, ss } TWW \)( 2  





{ 321 ,, sss } TWW \)( 3  




{ 4321 ,,, ssss } TWW \)( 4  
5 (2,1,0.5,1,3,0,2) {(2.5,1,0,0.5,3,0,2), 
(2.5,0.5,0.5,1,3,0,2), 
(2,1,0.5,1,3,0,1.5)} 
{ 54321 ,,,, sssss } TWW \)( 5  
6 (2,1,0.5,3,1,0,2) {(2.5,1,0,3,0.5,0,2), 
(2.5,0.5,0.5,3,1,0,2), 
(2,1,0.5,3,1,0,1.5)} 
{ 654321 ,,,,, ssssss } TWW \)( 6  
7 (2.5,0.5,0.5,1,3,0.5,2)   { 7654321 ,,,,,, sssssss } TWW \)( 7  
8 (2.5,0.5,0.5,3,1,0.5,2)   { 8654321 ,,,,,, sssssss } TWW \)( 8  
9 (2.5,0.5,0.5,1,3,1,1.5) {(2.5,0.5,0.5,1,3,1,0.5)} { 98654321 ,,,,,,, ssssssss } TWW \)( 9  
10 (2,1,0.5,1,3,1,0.5)   { 1098654321 ,,,,,,,, sssssssss } TWW \)( 10  
11 (2.5,0.5,0.5,3,1,1,1.5) {(2.5,0.5,0.5,3,1,1,0.5)} { 111098654321 ,,,,,,,,, ssssssssss } TWW \)( 11  
12 (2,1,0.5,3,1,1,0.5) --- -- --- 
Table 9 displays the objective values of all decision entities respectively towards each solution 
enumerated by the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm, while Table 10 shows the corresponding satisfactory degrees 
that are computed by the formulas (14), (15) and (16). As we can see from Table 9, under the current 














































11 zzzz )5.1,1,1,3,5.0,1,2(  
are the individual best solutions to the leader (the sales company), which 
implies that the leader anticipates that the middle-level and bottom-level followers (the logistics centers and 
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1 zzzzyy  to 
respond to itself after it determined x=2. However, it can be seen from Table 10 that the middle-level 
follower 2 and the bottom-level followers 11, 21, and 22 cannot always achieve individual best satisfactory 
degrees if they make the decisions desired by the leader. In the reference-uncooperative decision situation, 












1 zzzzyy )5.0,1,1,3,5.0,1(  to react to the leader’s decision x=2 
such that their satisfactory degrees all grow up to 1.0. 
Table 9 Solutions and objective values of decision entities 













1 (2,1,0.5,1,3,0.5,2) 8.0 7.0 14.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 5.0 
2 (2,1,0.5,3,1,0.5,2) 8.0 7.0 14.0 1.0 9.0 7.0 5.0 
3 (2,1,0.5,1,3,1,1.5) 8.0 7.0 14.0 7.0 7.0 5.0 6.0 
4 (2,1,0.5,3,1,1,1.5) 8.0 7.0 14.0 1.0 9.0 5.0 6.0 
5 (2,1,0.5,1,3,0,2) 8.5 7.0 12.5 7.0 7.0 7.5 3.5 
6 (2,1,0.5,3,1,0,2) 8.5 7.0 12.5 1.0 9.0 7.5 3.5 
7 (2.5,0.5,0.5,1,3,0.5,2) 9.0 8.0 12.5 6.75 6.75 7.25 5.25 
8 (2.5,0.5,0.5,3,1,0.5,2) 9.0 8.0 12.5 0.75 8.75 7.25 5.25 
9 (2.5,0.5,0.5,1,3,1,1.5) 9.0 8.0 12.5 6.75 6.75 5.25 6.25 
10 (2,1,0.5,1,3,1,0.5) 9.0 7.0 11.0 7.0 7.0 2.0 5.0 
11 (2.5,0.5,0.5,3,1,1,1.5) 9.0 8.0 12.5 0.75 8.75 5.25 6.25 
12 (2,1,0.5,3,1,1,0.5) 9.0 7.0 11.0 1.0 9.0 2.0 5.0 
More specifically, for the given decision )1,2(),( 1 yx  by the leader and the middle-level follower 1, the 
bottom-level followers 11 and 12 achieve a Nash equilibrium solution )1,3(),( 1211 zz  to respond to the 
leader and the middle-level follower 1. Similarly, for the given decision )5.0,2(),( 2 yx  by the leader and 
the middle-level follower 2, the bottom-level followers 21 and 22 achieve a Nash equilibrium solution 
)5.0,1(),( 2221 zz  to respond to the leader and the middle-level follower 2. Therefore, )1,3,1(),,( 12111 zzy  
and )5.0,1,5.0(),,( 22212 zzy  
are Stackelberg-Nash solutions respectively for the middle-level follower i 
(i=1,2) and its bottom-level followers under the given decision 1x  by the leader. Also, for the given 
decision x=2 by the leader, )5.0,1(),( 21 yy  
is a Nash equilibrium solution for the middle-level followers 












12 zzzzyyx )5.0,1,1,3,5.0,1,2(  is a Stackelberg-Nash solution to the production-inventory 
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planning problem. 
Table 10 The satisfactory degree of decision entities towards solutions 
Iteration 
k 







































2222 f  
1 8.0 11.5 1.0 7.0 9.5 1.0 11.0 15.0 0.25 5.0 7.0 0 7.0 7.0 1.0 6.5 7.5 0.5 4.0 5.0 0 
2 8.0 11.5 1.0 7.0 9.5 1.0 11.0 15.0 0.25 1.0 1.0 1.0 9.0 11.0 1.0 6.5 7.5 0.5 4.0 5.0 0 
3 8.0 11.5 1.0 7.0 9.5 1.0 11.0 15.0 0.25 5.0 7.0 0 7.0 7.0 1.0 5.0 6.0 1.0 5.0 6.5 0.33 
4 8.0 11.5 1.0 7.0 9.5 1.0 11.0 15.0 0.25 1.0 1.0 1.0 9.0 11.0 1.0 5.0 6.0 1.0 5.0 6.5 0.33 
5 8.0 11.5 0.86 7.0 9.5 1.0 11.0 15.0 0.63 5.0 7.0 0 7.0 7.0 1.0 6.5 7.5 0 3.0 3.5 0 
6 8.0 11.5 0.86 7.0 9.5 1.0 11.0 15.0 0.63 1.0 1.0 1.0 9.0 11.0 1.0 6.5 7.5 0 3.0 3.5 0 
7 8.0 11.5 0.71 7.0 9.5 0.6 8.0 13.5 0.18 4.75 6.75 0 6.75 6.75 1.0 6.75 7.75 0.5 3.75 5.25 0 
8 8.0 11.5 0.71 7.0 9.5 0.6 8.0 13.5 0.18 0.75 0.75 1.0 8.75 10.75 1.0 6.75 7.75 0.5 3.75 5.25 0 
9 8.0 11.5 0.71 7.0 9.5 0.6 8.0 13.5 0.18 4.75 6.75 0 6.75 6.75 1.0 5.25 6.25 1.0 4.75 6.75 0.25 
10 8.0 11.5 0.71 7.0 9.5 1.0 11.0 15.0 1.0 5.0 7.0 0 7.0 7.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 5.0 6.5 1.0 
11 8.0 11.5 0.71 7.0 9.5 0.6 8.0 13.5 0.18 0.75 0.75 1.0 8.75 10.75 1.0 5.25 6.25 1.0 4.75 6.75 0.25 
12 8.0 11.5 0.71 7.0 9.5 1.0 11.0 15.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 9.0 11.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 5.0 6.5 1.0 












12 zzzzyyx , the leader cannot obtain a better objective value or a higher 
satisfactory degree by moving away from the vertex over the inducible region (IR) under the 
Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium among all decision entities. Also, it is noticeable that each follower and its 
counterparts have to achieve the Nash equilibrium when making their individual decisions, because their 














12 zzzzyyx  is the optimal solution to the 
MFTL decision model (17), which means a final compromised result among all decision entities under the 
current decision context in the conglomerate enterprise. This MFTL hierarchical decision situation indicates 
that the leader may not achieve an individual optimal solution under the constraint region even though it has 
priority in making decisions, since its decisions are determined by implicit reactions of the followers. 
Moreover, the decision process and results of an MFTL decision problem are affected by the 
reference-uncooperative relationship among multiple followers at the same level. In summary, the proposed 
MFTL decision techniques provide an effective way to model and solve real-world MFTL decision problems 
and to recognize the satisfactory degree of decision entities towards solutions. 
Furthermore, by the optimal solution, we can analyze whether or not the conglomerate employed practical 
and effective management strategies to balance the production-inventory planning among its subordinate 
sales company, logistics centers and manufacturing factories. Based on the given experimental data in Table 
5, the contrastive analysis between the upper limits to the holding inventory or overtime production capacity 
of each decision entity and the final solution is shown as Fig. 6. It can be seen from Fig. 6 that the holding 
29 
inventories of the logistics centers peak at their respective upper limits. Also, the production outputs of the 
manufacturing factories 11 and 21 reach their maximum overtime production capacities respectively. In 
contrast, the holding inventory or overtime production outputs of other decision entities are less or much less 
than their corresponding upper limits. These results indicate that decision entities whose inventory holding 
cost or overtime production cost is lower prefer to keep more inventories or manufacture more production 
outputs under the current decision context, which is exactly desired by the conglomerate as presented in 
Section 5.1. Therefore, the current management strategy implemented by the conglomerate is an available 
way to balance the production-inventory planning throughout the three-stage supply chain with conflicting 
objectives of decision entities. 
 
Fig. 6. The contrastive analysis of results 
5.4. Further discussions 
This section will discuss in depth characteristics of the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm and the evaluation 
criterion defined by fuzzy programming. Also, we will analyze limitations to our research and address future 
studies. 
Table 8 clearly shows that we finally find an optimal solution by completing the enumeration of 12 
vertices, of which most (8 in 12) are accompanied by the same decision made by the leader and the 
middle-level followers, which implies that the search approach of the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm is easily 
convergent. Also, only a few data involving kW , T, and W are necessary to write down within the algorithm 
operation. We can also observe the features of the algorithm through computing Example 1 in Section 3. 
Thus, the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm can be carried out efficiently because each successive pair of points is 
adjacent. Moreover, note that the other 11 vertices searched, apart from the optimal vertex 12, are all feasible 
solutions to the MFTL decision problem even if they cannot be an optimal solution. The property gives us 
another advantage of the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm in that the upper and lower bounds on an optimal 
solution are generated by the procedure even if storage or computational limits are reached before 









Leader Follower 1 Follower 2 Follower 11 Follower 12 Follower 21 Follower 22
Decision entities
Decision results Upper limits to decision variables
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number of decision variables and constraints exist, the execution efficiency of the algorithm may experience 
a steep decline as superabundant vertices are needed to complete the search. Our future research will explore 
the performance of the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm through sufficient numerical experiments. 
It is noticeable from Tables 9 and 10 that the middle-level follower 2 obtains the same individual 
objective value 12.5 at the vertices 
5s  and 
7s ; however, following this, the decision entity achieves two 
different satisfactory degrees 0.63 and 0.18 respectively. Also, note Table 3 in Section 4 that the objective 
value of the bottom-level follower 11 in Example 1 becomes worse from 7.5 to 9.0; however, following this, 
the corresponding satisfactory degree increases from 0.83 to 1.0. Evidently, it is not a positive correlation 
between the objective value and the corresponding satisfactory degree for followers. In this case study, the 
situation means that the feasible set and the rational set of the middle-level follower 2 are changed as the 
leader and the middle-level follower 1 change their decisions )1,2(),( 1 yx  to 
)5.0,5.2(),( 1 yx . 
Therefore, the satisfactory degree can be considered as a relative but not an absolute evaluation criterion as 
individual best and worst objective values of each decision entity would vary with the changing externalities 
determined by others, which clearly reflects the characteristic of the MFTL hierarchical decision-making 
process. 
In this study, we focus on the reference-uncooperative relationship within a three-stage supply chain 
comprised of one leader and multiple followers. All decision entities have to achieve a Stackelberg-Nash 
solution under the current decision conditions within the three-stage supply chain. Thus, under the 
uncooperative situation, decision entities have to adjust the current decision context through changing 
objective functions or constraint conditions to generate a new round of decision-making processes if they 
desire to improve their respective satisfactory degrees. However, all decision entities that are distributed 
throughout a conglomerate enterprise may have chances to cooperate with each other and achieve an 
agreement on their decisions in the real world. For example, if the leader desires to improve its own 
satisfactory degree, it may persuade the middle-level follower 2 and the bottom-level follower 22 to react to 
others’ decisions )1,3,1,1,2(),,,,( 2112111 zzzyx  by determining their own decisions )5.1,5.0(),( 222 zy  












4 zzzzyyx )5.1,1,3,1,5.0,1,2( . Thus, definitions of the satisfactory degree provide a practical 
way in finding some possibly satisfactory solutions but not just a Stackelberg-Nash solution to a MFTL 
decision case in the real world, because the satisfactory degree can be considered as an evaluation criterion 
that can be adopted to recognize a solution whether or not decision entities desire it. Also, the evaluation 
criterion provides an available approach to solve a MFTL decision problem without a Stackelberg-Nash 
solution. As we discussed above, if decision entities are willing to cooperate with each other, we can find a 
satisfactory solution through recognizing the satisfactory degree of decision entities. Our future research will 
extend the evaluation criterion defined by the fuzzy programming approach to handle real-world MFTL 
decision cases in which there does not exist a Stackelberg-Nash solution or decision entities prefer to 
cooperate with one another. 
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6. Conclusions and further study 
This paper presents our development to handle the reference-uncooperative MFTL decision problem: 
information exchange among multiple followers at the same level even though they are independent and 
uncooperative decision entities. Solving this decision problem needs to find an optimal solution achieving 
not only the Stackelberg equilibrium in the vertical structure but also the Nash equilibrium among multiple 
followers at the same horizontal level. The paper therefore first proposed a general MFTL decision model to 
describe the reference-uncooperative situation. It then developed a MFTL Kth-Best algorithm to find an 
optimal solution (also known as a Stackelberg-Nash solution) to the model based on related theoretical 
properties. Moreover, we evaluated the solution obtained and identified the satisfaction of decision entities 
using a fuzzy programming approach. Lastly, a real-world case study on production-inventory planning 
illustrated the effectiveness of the proposed MFTL decision techniques in handling such problems of 
applications. The results indicate that this paper provides a practical way to deal with reference-based 
uncooperative MFTL hierarchical decision-making problems from the perspective of theory and application. 
The limitation of this study is that the computational load of the MFTL Kth-Best algorithm may increase 
steeply with increase in the mass of variables and constraints. Thus, we will explore the execution efficiency 
of the algorithm through sufficient numerical experiments in our future study. We will also extend the 
evaluation criterion defined by the fuzzy programming approach to solve MFTL decision problems without 
Stackelberg-Nash solutions. In addition, we will focus our future research on other relationships, such as 
cooperative and semi-cooperative situations [18], among multiple followers in MFTL decision problems. 
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